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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.
19149

RICHARD I. CINTRON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Richard I. Cintron, appeals his
convictions for Aggravated Burglary, a felony in the first
degree, Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-203 (1978), and Aggravated

Robbery, also a felony in the first degree, Utah Code Ann.
§

76-6-302 (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court in

and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James
S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of both offenses in a
jury trial held November 22, 23, and 24, 1982.

Appellant

was sentenced to serve five years to life in the Utah State
Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgments
below.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 26, 1982, the
victim, William Parker, who lived alone in his home at 11760
South State Street in Sandy, Utah, was awakened by his dog.
Parker then heard the sound of the back screen door shutting
and went to investigate (Tl. 12-14, 35).

He turned on the

kitchen lights, which consisted of three large, base 100watt globe lights (Tl. 13, 38). The porch wall light outside
next to the back door and the overhead light in the middle
of the porch were also on (Tl. 36-37).

Parker looked

through the window sheers and saw a man, whom he identified
as appellant, standing on the back porch (Tl. 14, 36).
Parker immediately recognized the man as the
"Spanish-looking" young man who had come to his house on
three occasions during the previous three days.

Parker had

first seen appellant early the morning of July 23, 1982,
when appellant had come to Parker's house asking for
gasoline (Tl. 15, 10, 143, 145-146).

Parker had had no

gasoline and had sent appellant to his sister's house, next
door to his, approximately 150 yards to the north (Tl. 15,
142, 146).

Parker had next seen appellant in the late

afternoon of that same day, when appellant came by just to
talk.

Parker had last seen appellant at approximately 10:00

p.m. on July 25, 1982, when appellant knocked at Parker's
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door, wanting Parker to let him come in and talk.

Parker

had refused (Tl. 16).
Because Parker recognized that it was appellant on
his back porch the morning of July 26, 1982, he opened the
door slightly and asked appellant what he wanted.

Appellant

said, "I am scared; I am scared," and tried to push his way
into the house (Tl. 17, 36, 56).

Parker held appellant out

and asked what he was afraid of.

Appellant replied, "This,"

and appellant's blond accomplice came into view and kicked
the door open with both feet, knocking Parker to the floor
(Tl. 18, 39-41, 55-58).
The blond man, who was holding a knife, rolled
Parker over onto his stomach, stomped on Parker's back and
head with his feet, and threatened to cut Parker's throat
(Tl. 18-20, 40-42).

When Parker's dog barked at the

intruders, distracting them, Parker attempted to wrestle the
knife away from the blond man, and as a result Parker's hand
was severely cut (Tl. 20).
Appellant's accomplice then blindfolded Parker,
and they took him into the bedroom, where they tied him upon
the bed (Tl. 20-22, 41-42).

During this time, Parker heard

the blond man call appellant "Gary" several times, but later
Parker heard the blond man call appellant "Rich" (Tl. 23,
45, 49-52).

Parker testified that he heard just the one
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word, "Rich," and "[t]hen something about going and getting
something" (Tl. 50).
After the two men left, Parker untied himself,
walked over to his sister's house, and told his brother-inlaw, Wayne C. Dahl, to telephone the police and tell them he
had been robbed (Tl. 23-24, 74-75).
had robbed him.

Dahl asked Parker who

Parker answered, "Well, one of them is the

same guy that run out of gas that night, come and got gas"
(Tl. 24

I

75).
Dahl remembered appellant as the one who had come

for gasoline on the morning of July 23, 1982.

After going

to Parker's house, appellant had gone to Dahl's house to ask
for gasoline (Tl. 15, 71, 142, 146).

Dahl had given

appellant a can of gasoline, and appellant had paid for the
gasoline and left his driver's license with Dahl as security
for the can.

Dahl remembered that the name "Richard

Cintron" appeared on the license and that his birthday was
October 28, 1957.

October 28th is the Dahls' wedding

anniversary (Tl. 72-73, 142-143).

Thus, when Dahl

telephoned the police, he described the two men as Parker
had described them to him and gave them appellant's name as
one of the burglars (Tl. 76, 81-82).
After Parker had been treated for his wound, he
returned to his home and discovered that his microwave oven
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and five of his guns had been taken (Tl. 25).

None of the

stolen items have been recovered (Tl. 44).
Later that same day, July 26, 1982, Draper Chief
of Police F. R. Long showed the victim a photo lineup
consisting of photographs of six individuals, one of whom
was appellant.

Parker unhesitatingly pointed to appellant's

photograph, saying, "That's the one."

(Tl. 356).

Appellant was arrested August 26, 1982 (R. 16).
He was tried by jury in the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County on November 22, 23, and 24, 1982.
Appellant presented a defense of alibi (R. 75, 92-93).

The

jury found appellant guilty of Aggravated Burglary and
Aggravated Robbery.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION.
Appellant claims that the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to support his convictions for
Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Robbery.

In considering

a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, this Court has always applied the following
standard of review.
We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the
evidence [viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict] is
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sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt . • .
State v. Brafford, Utah, 663 P.2d 68 (1983), quoting
State y. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443 (1983), brackets in
original.

In State y. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161

(1980), the Court also stated:
It is the defendant's burden to
establish that the evidence was so
inconclusive or insubstantial that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime charged.
.IJ;l. at 1168, emphasis added.

In addition, in a recent

decision, this Court reaffirmed its deference to conclusions
reached by the jury in matters solely within its province:
It is the exclusive function of the Jury
to weigh the evidence and to determine
the credibility of the witnesses, and it
is not within the prerogative of the
Court to substitute its judgment for
that of the fact-finder.
State y. Jolley, Utah (Case No. 18559, filed July 6,
1983), quoting State y. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231
(1980).
Appellant has not met his burden of establishing
that the evidence against him was so inconclusive or
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
Appellant conceded at trial that the victim's home
had been burglarized and that the victim had been robbed.
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Appellant claimed only that the victim was mistaken as to
the identity of the perpetrators of the crimes (Tl. 10-11).
The evidence pertaining to the victim's identification of
appellant, however, established beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant participated in the crimes.
The victim, William Parker, immediately recognized
appellant when he saw appellant on the back porch of his
home on the morning of July 26, 1982.

Parker had seen

appellant three times during the previous three days (T2.
15-16).

Parker had a clear view of appellant at the time of

the burglary through the sheer curtain.

Three large, base

100-watt globe lights were on in the kitchen, as were two
porch lights, one on the outside porch wall in front of
appellant and one on the ceiling of the porch above
appellant (Tl. 14, 36-38).

Parker was not wearing his

glasses, but appellant stood only approximately three feet
from him, and Parker testified that he has no difficulty
seeing clearly at that distance.

Parker only wears his

glasses when he reads fine print or when his eyes are tired
(T.l 6869).
Later, the day of the crimes, Parker
unhesitatingly identified appellant in a photo lineup
prepared by Draper Chief of Police, F. R. Long (Tl. 97-99).
Parker also positively identified appellant in court (Tl.
17).

Parker also testified at trial that he heard the blond
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man once refer to appellant as "Rich" in connection with
•something about going and getting something" (Tl. 23, 45,
49-50, 52).
His identification evidence was buttressed by the
testimony of Wayne Dahl, the victim's brother-in-law.

Dahl

testified that Parker told him that one of the robbers was
the person who had asked for gasoline three nights prior to
the burglary (Tl. 24, 75).

Dahl recalled appellant's name

and birthdate from the driver's license appellant had left
with him as security for the gasoline can (Tl. 72-73).

Dahl

also positively identified appellant at trial as the person
who had purchased gasoline from him three nights prior to
the burglary (Tl. 73).
Appellant did not deny that he asked Parker and
Dahl for gasoline on July 23, 1982, but he did deny
returning to Parker's residence at any time after that
morning (T.2 142-146).

Appellant claimed that he was

drinking with friends during the time Parker was robbed (Tl.
128-135, 147-149, 152, 154-164).

However, the prosecution

rebutted appellant's alibi with the testimony of Dick
Forbes, Investigator for the Salt Lake County Attorney's
Office.

Forbes testified that appellant's alibi witneses in

an earlier conversation with him had been unable to account
for appellant's whereabouts during the critical early
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1

morning hours of July 26, 1982 (Tl. 173-177).
By finding appellant guilty, the jury rejected
appellant's alibi defense and accepted the victim's
identification of appellant.

The evidence was sufficient to

support the jury's finding, and reasonable minds could not
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt.
Therefore, the convictions should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE PROSECUTOR'S QUESTION CONCERNING
APPELLANT'S PRIOR THEFT CONVICTION WAS
PROPER.
The prosecutor asked appellant on crossexamination whether he had "ever been convicted of a theft
offense"

(Tl. 152).

Appellant's objection to the question

was overruled (Tl. 152).

Appellant claims this was error.

Rule 21, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
"Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime not
involving dishonesty or false statement shall be
inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his credibility,
except as otherwise provided by statute.•

1
Appellant objected to the State's calling Forbes as an
alibi rebuttal witness because he had not been so listed in
strict conformity with Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (1982). The
objection was overruled because the State had, in response
to appellant's discovery motion, provided appellant with a
copy of Forbe's report of the alibi statements made to him.
Forbes' name appeared on the report.
The court ruled that
such constituted constructive compliance with the rule (Tl.
169-171).
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By implication, this rule permits the use of
evidence of a crime that does involve dishonesty, regardless
of classification, for the purpose of impairing a witness's
credibility.

Theft is a crime involving dishonesty.

~

y. Johnson, 666 P.2d 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983); State y.
Carden, 650 P.2d 97 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).

Therefore, it was

not error for the prosecutor to question appellant
concerning his prior theft conviction.
As noted by appellant in his brief, Rule 21 by it
terms does not apply where a statute provides otherwise.
Utah Code Ann.

§

78-24-9 (1953), provides that "a witness

must answer as to the fact of his previous conviction of
felony.•

Thus, a witness is required to answer questions

concerning prior felony convictions, including questions
concerning felony convictions

~

involving dishonesty or

false statement, evidence of which would otherwise be
inadmissible under Rule 21.

While this statute, when read

in connection with Rule 21, does not permit questions
concerning misdemeanor convictions for crimes which did not
involve dishonesty, it does not preclude questions
concerning misdemeanor convictions for crimes such as theft
which do.

Thus, the question was proper.
POINT III
APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE
CLOSING ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL FOR CODEFENDANT.
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In closing argument, Jo Carol Nesset-Sale,
counsel for co-defendant Joseph Price, commented on the
strength of the State's case against appellant and suggested
that his accomplice was alibi witness James McCall and not
her client (T2. 35-37).

Appellant objected to this line of

argument, but did not move for mistrial or severance.

The

ObJection was overruled because the court ruled it could not
restrain counsel from arguing the evidence (T2. 35).
Appellant contends this was error.
"Great latitude is accorded counsel in presenting
his closing argument.

He is allowed to summarize and

discuss the evidence adduced and to draw reasonable
inferences therefrom, with a view toward assisting the jury
to analyze and evaluate the evidence."
PROCEDURE

§

523

(1975)

3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL

(emphasis added).

In the case at

bar, counsel for codefendant Price merely discusssed the
evidence against appellant and argued that it could be
reasonably inferred from the evidence that appellant's blond
accomplice was alibi witness McCall and not her client.
Thus, this line of argument was within the permissible scope
of closing argument.
Furthermore, appellant was not prejudiced by the
mere fact that counsel for co-defendant implied that
appellant was guilty because the remarks could not
reasonably have affected the verdict •
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.s..e.e_., .e.....g_,_,

State y. Lewis, 430 N.E.2d 1346 (Ill. 1981); Dean y,
~.

430 S.2d 491 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App. 1983).

The

evidence of appellant's identity was overwhelming, such that
there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would
have been different absent co-counsel's comments.
Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974),

State y.

Also,

because co-defendant Price was also found guilty, it is
obvious that the jury was not persuaded by the argument.
Thus, appellant was in no way prejudiced.
Workman y. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 Pac. 1033
(1928), cited by appellant, is not on point.

In Workman

counsel commented that he had personal knowledge of the
credibility of certain witnesses.

In the instant case,

counsel for co-defendant did not claim personal knowledge as
to any matter but merely discussed the evidence and the
reasonable inferences which could be drawn therefrom.
Therefore, the argument of counsel for the co-defendant was
permissible.
CONCLUSION
The evidence supported appellant's convictions.
Appellant's identity as one of the burglars was established
beyond a reasonable doubt.

The victim's identification of

appellant was certain and consistent.

No other issue was

disputed at trial.
It was not improper for the prosecutor to
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question appellant concerning his prior theft conviction
because theft is a crime involving dishonesty.

Also, the

arguments of counsel for appellant's co-defendant were not
improper.

Furthermore, appellant was not prejudiced by

counsel for the co-defendant arguing the evidence because
there is no reasonable likelihood that the result of the
trial would have been different absent such remarks.
Therefore, the convictions should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

~ftk~~~-----' 1983.

~{~~day

of

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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